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Impact of Competition Between ISPs on the Net
Neutrality Debate
Pierre Coucheney, Patrick Maillé, Bruno Tuffin
Abstract—Network neutrality is the topic of a vivid and very
sensitive debate, in both the telecommunication and political
worlds, because of its potential impact in everyday life. That
debate has been raised by Internet Service Providers (ISPs), com-
plaining that content providers (CPs) congest the network with
insufficient monetary compensation, and threatening to impose
side payments to CPs in order to support their infrastructure
costs. While there have been many studies discussing the advan-
tages and drawbacks of neutrality, there is no game-theoretical
work dealing with the observable situation of competitive ISPs
in front of a (quasi-)monopolistic CP. Though, this is a typical
situation that is condemned by ISPs, and, according to them,
another reason of the non-neutrality need.
We develop and analyze here a model describing the relations
between two competitive ISPs and a single CP, played as a three-
level game corresponding to three different time scales. At the
largest time scale, side payments (if any) are determined. At a
smaller time scale, ISPs decide their (flat-rate) subscription fee
(toward users), then the CP chooses the (flat-rate) price to charge
users. Users finally select their ISP (if any) using a price-based
discrete choice model, and decide whether to also subscribe to
the CP service. The game is analyzed by backward induction. As
a conclusion, we obtain among other things that non-neutrality
may be beneficial to the CP, and not necessarily to ISPs, unless
the side payments are decided by ISPs.
Index Terms—Network neutrality, Game theory, Pricing
I. INTRODUCTION
There has recently been a strong debate around the so-
called network neutrality. The debate has been ignited by
the increasing traffic asymmetry between Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), mainly due to some prominent and resource
consuming content providers (CPs) which are usually con-
nected to a single ISP. The typical example is YouTube (owned
by Google), accessed by all users while hosted by a single
Tier 1 ISP, and whose traffic now constitutes a non-negligible
part of the whole Internet traffic. Another example is the
subscription-based video service Netflix, that is in the US
the most bandwidth-consuming source of traffic, representing
23.3% of the total Internet traffic in late 2011 [1], while having
commercial relationships with only one ISP. For those reasons,
there has been a surge of protest among ISPs, complaining that
the current Internet business model where ISPs charge both
end-users and content providers directly connected to them,
and have public peering or transit agreements with other ISPs,
is not relevant anymore. The main solution proposed is that
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ISPs should also charge content providers that are associated
with other ISPs [2], as first advocated by Ed Whitacre (CEO
of AT&T) at the end of 2005 [3].
The underlying concern is that investment is made by
ISPs but content providers get an important part of the divi-
dends. The revenue arising from on-line advertising (meaning
showing graphical ads on regular web pages) is estimated at
approximately a $24 billion in 2009 [4], while textual ads on
search pages has led to a combined revenue of $8.5 billion
in 2007 [5], those figures increasing every year. Meanwhile,
transit prices - which constitute the main source of revenues
for transit ISPs - are decreasing. ISPs argue that there is
no sufficient incentive for them to continue to invest on
the network infrastructures if most benefits go to content
providers. The threat is to lower the quality of service of
CPs that do not pay any fee to them, or even to block their
traffic. This possibility has led to protests from CPs and user
associations, complaining that this might impact the network
development and is an impingement of freedom of speech [3].
The debate was thus launched, essentially at the law and policy
makers level, to decide whether the Internet should be neutral,
i.e., all packets should receive equal treatments in terms of
price and service. In the US, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) released in 2007 a report not supporting neutrality
constraints, increasing the debate at the political level. This
debate is also active in Europe and in France, as illustrated
by the open consultation on network neutrality launched in
2010. For instance, the French regulation authority, ARCEP,
has published in its response a proposal intending to define
how net neutrality could be implemented [6], [7].
There has been an increasing attention in the literature
on providing a mathematical analysis of the advantages and
drawbacks of network neutrality. The idea is to investigate the
output of the interactions between selfish actors that are end
users, CPs and ISPs, using the framework of non-cooperative
game theory [8], [9]. Let us briefly describe here, non ex-
haustively, some important existing works in that direction. In
[10], [11], the authors propose to share the revenue among
providers using the Shapley value, the only mechanism that
satisfies a set of axioms representing a sense of fairness; in this
case CPs participate to the network access cost. The work in
[12] analyzes how neutrality or non-neutrality affects provider
investment incentives, network quality, and user prices. A sim-
ilar comparison is made in [13] between a two-sided pricing
scheme where ISPs are allowed to charge CPs, and one-sided
pricing where such side-payments are not allowed. In each
case, at the equilibrium of the game, the levels of investment
in content and architecture are determined. The paper gives
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conditions on the ratio between parameters characterizing
advertising rates and end-user price sensitivity, under which
a non-neutral network outperforms a neutral one in terms of
social welfare. On the other hand, [14] investigates the case
where ISPs negotiate joint investment contracts with a CP in
order to enhance the quality of service and increase industry
profits. It is found that an unregulated regime leads to higher
quality investments, but that ISPs have an incentive to degrade
content quality. The paper [15] studies the implications of non-
neutral behaviors, taking into account advertising revenues and
considering both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. In
[16], we analyze and compare thanks to game-theoretic tools
three different situations of interactions between ISPs: the case
of peering between the ISPs, the case where ISPs do not share
their traffic (exclusivity arrangements), and the case where
they fix a transfer price per unit of volume. The paper supports
the transit price scenario and suggests a limited regulation
(enforcing global connectivity) to prevent incumbent ISPs
from having a dominant position in the bargaining. Finally, in
[17], a game-theoretic model is considered with a single CP,
a single ISP, a (consumers’) demand function that depends on
price and quality of service, and involving advertisement and
network investment components.
In those works, there is in general a single ISP, and one
or several CPs. Though, in practice, we often have ISPs
in competition for customers, while for many services, the
CPs are in a quasi monopoly, a characteristic ISPs complain
about. (Typical examples are YouTube for non-copyrighted
videos, and Netflix for movies and TV shows in the US.) We
propose to specifically address this issue in this paper. Remark
that in addition to [13], considering competitive ISPs has
been proposed in [18], but with competition over consumers,
quality and prices for heterogeneous CPs: none of those
works consider a monopolistic CP as can be encountered for
some applications. We already addressed this type of problem
in [19], whose model was inspired by [15], users were assumed
to always go with the cheapest provider. As a consequence, we
ended up with a price war (a classical Bertrand competition)
such that ISPs always decrease their subscription price in order
to attract all demand.
We consider here a more realistic user association model
such that users make their choice still based on the price of
ISPs, but also on other unknown considerations, hence the use
of a classical discrete choice model as in [16]. This requires a
derivation of results totally different from [19]. To analyze that
situation, we propose a multi-level game where decisions are
taken at different time scales. The solutions of the games at the
largest time scales, played first, are determined using backward
induction, meaning that players anticipate the impact on, and
the resulting solution of, the games played later on at smaller
time scales.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
basic assumptions of the model we are going to consider,
the different levels of game, and the mathematical description
of the investigated comparison between the neutral and the
non-neutral regimes. It also describes how users select their
ISP (if any), and how the aggregated demand at the CP is
determined. The next sections present the various game levels
End-users
ISP A
pA
ISP BpB
CP 1
qA
qB
p1
Fig. 1. Charging interactions between stakeholders. Prices p1, pA and pB
are positive flat rates, whereas qA and qB are positive per volume unit prices.
for providers’ decisions: we describe in Section III how the
CP, anticipating the decisions of end users, chooses the content
price. At a higher level, by backward induction, ISPs play a
game on the access charge for end users; this competition is
described in Section IV. We then describe the game at the
highest level, on the economic relationships between the ISPs
and the CP, by determining the side payments of the CP to the
ISPs in Section V. We address the case when those prices are
fixed by ISPs, based on a game; we also look at the case when
they are decided by the CP, or by a regulator (maximizing
the supply chain value for instance). Section VI concludes by
discussing the impact and relevance of side payments on the
providers’ revenues, highlighting that it is not always in the
interest of the ISPs (but could be), while an appropriate choice
of side payments may increase the CP revenue. We also give
in that section directions for future research.
II. MODEL
A. Topology and Pricing Structure
We consider a single CP, whose parameters will be indexed
by 1, and two ISPs, named (and indexed by) A and B. The
access prices charged to users are flat rate subscription fees,
denoted by p1, pA and pB for respectively the CP, ISP A
and ISP B. In order to study non-neutrality, we also introduce
side payments qA and qB representing the per unit of volume
prices that the CP has to pay to A and B, respectively. All
prices are assumed to be positive. Finally, the set of end users
is considered continuous and (without loss of generality) of
mass one, so that we will indifferently refer to “mass” and
“proportion” of users. The charges imposed by actors to other
players are summarized in Figure 1, the arrows indicating the
cash flows.
B. User Demand
Users have to pay both the ISP and the CP to access
the content. Users first choose their ISP, to which they pay
a flat-rate subscription fee, and then subscribe to the CP
too if its (flat) fee is not too high. Since users need an
Internet access, not only to reach the content of the CP, but
also for other purposes (e-mail, web browsing, ...), we de-
correlate the ISP choice from the (individual) decision to
subscribe to the CP, hence the independence from p1. Among
those access subscribers, the proportion who also subscribe
to the CP depends on p1 on the other hand, but not on the
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subscription price to the ISPs as a first-order model, assuming
as a consequence that users do not relate their consumption
of content to the previously paid ISP subscription fee.
Let us focus first on the ISP selection by users. In a previous
work [19], we have considered users simply selecting the
cheapest ISP (or choosing it randomly if price equality holds).
However, this does not take into account the phenomenon
of stickiness or loyalty of the users, highlighted in [20]. In
the model considered here, user choices are influenced by
the ISP subscription prices, but also by other considerations
(reputation or preferences) that can be modeled as an addi-
tive noise to the main criteria determining the choice. We
consider here a discrete choice model, a standard paradigm
in economy, transportation, etc., and surprisingly not often
applied in telecommunications. It is a common way to model
how decision makers choose among a set of alternatives.
Mathematically, we assume that a user has a valuation of
the form vi = β log(1/pi) + κi for ISP i, and selects the
highest-valued option (see [16] for details). The term κi is an
individual-specific random term, taking into account unknown
aspects and assumed to follow a Gumbel distribution as in
standard discrete choice models [21]. We additionally assume
that there is a fictitious price p0, assumed to be strictly
positive, and representing the cost of the outside option, i.e.,
the perceived cost of not having access to the Internet. Thus if
the (random) valuation associated with that outside option is
larger than the ones associated with each ISP, the user prefers
not to join the network. The parameter β > 0 represents the
user sensitivity to the subscription prices: values of β close
to zero lead to an uniform choice over the three alternatives
(connecting to one of the two ISPs, or not having access
to the Internet) regardless of the prices set, whereas large
values of β make the users choose the least expensive option.
The term log(1/pi) expresses the dissatisfaction for higher
prices, the logarithm being used to represent the fact that the
same variation of price is felt smaller at high prices than
at low prices: users are sensitive to relative price variations
rather than absolute ones. Finally, the case pi = 0 leads to
the maximal possible valuation independently of the random
terms, meaning that ISP i attracts all users, or (say, from
symmetry) half of them if the other ISP chooses a null price
as well.
At a macroscopic level, by discrete choice analysis, the
proportion (or equivalently, the mass) σi of users selecting
ISP i (with also j ∈ {A,B}; j 6= i), can be shown to equal
from our expression of vi (see [21] for a general derivation)
σi =


p−βi
p−βA + p
−β
B + p
−β
0
if pA > 0 and pB > 0
1 if pi = 0 and pj > 0
1/2 if pA = 0 and pB = 0
0 if pi > 0 and pj = 0.
(1)
This repartition function expresses the fact that all users select
an ISP if at least one of the subscription prices is null (pA = 0
or pB = 0). Of course, the higher the price, the fewer
subscribers; this effect increasing with the user sensitivity to
price β.
In this paper, we propose a new aggregated user demand in
terms of data volume on ISP i, where users having selected an
ISP then decide whether to use the content offered by the CP,
depending on the flat-rate price p1. We consider that users’
willingness-to-pay for the CP service (i.e., the access to all the
content offered by the CP) follows an exponential distribution
with mean value 1/α > 0 over the population, independently
of the ISP choice. Therefore, a proportion e−αp1 of each
ISP’s subscribers also subscribes to the CP, hence a number
σie
−αp1 subscribing to both the CP and ISP i. Note that the
consequence of our assumption is an exponentially decreasing
demand function (in terms of the CP price), a usual setting in
economic theory.
We assume that there is an average volume D0 of data that
a user downloads from the CP if subscribing to it. The value
will be helpful to compute the volume-based transit costs for
the CP to the ISPs. This volume is assumed to be independent
of the ISP choice. Instead of considering an average volume,
we could say that it is the same value for all users without
changing the expressions; an average value just allows to take
into account the potential variations between users that are
averaged when summing over all subscribers of an ISP. D0
is additionally assumed independent of p1, meaning that users
just get what they “need" if subscribing. As a result, the data
volume for users subscribing simultaneously to the CP and to
ISP i is given by:
Di = D0σie
−αp1 . (2)
The parameter α > 0 can be interpreted as the sensitivity of
users to the CP price: the global demand (sum of demands on
all ISPs) is a decreasing function of α.
Notice that demand does not directly depend on the side
payments qA and qB . But the introduction of side payments
will induce a reaction on the prices pA, pB and p1 set by ISPs
and the CP at equilibrium, which, in turn, indirectly affects
demand. Finally, the global volume demand for CP data DA+
DB equals (σA + σB)D0e
−αp1 .
C. Utility and revenue functions
Among the proportion σA+σB of users having accepted to
pay for an access to the network, and then paying a flat-rate
price p1 to the CP, some would have accepted to pay more to
benefit from the content of the CP. The surplus of users that
would have accepted to pay p is p− p1, while the proportion
of users willing to pay more than p is e−αp1 .
We can then compute the user welfare associated with the
existence of the CP, as the sum over all users of the benefit
they make accessing the content of the CP. Note that this
does not include the benefit that users make by selecting an
ISP, which is associated with other (free) on-line services.
From our assumption of an exponential distribution of users’
willingness-to-pay for the content (yielding a density αe−αx),
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the user welfare due to the CP can be computed as:
UWCP = (σA + σB)
∫ ∞
p1
αe−αx(x− p1)dx
= (σA + σB)
e−αp1
α
=
DA +DB
αD0
. (3)
The utilities (revenues) of the ISPs come from the end users
subscription fee, and from the CP through the possible side
payment. The first one depends on the mass of users with
the ISP, and the second one on the total amount of volume
downloaded by users. Hence, for ISP i (i ∈ {A,B}), the
revenue is
Ui = piσi + qiDi. (4)
We can remark here that the revenue is always positive since
we do not consider the cost of the network.
The utility of the CP in this model is the sum of revenues
gained by users subscribing through A and through B. Those
gains come from the flat-rate subscriptions by users through
each ISP i, p1σie
−αp1 , but the volume-based side payments
qiDi paid to i also have to be taken into account. The CP net
benefit (utility) is thus given by
U1 = (p1σAe
−αp1 − qADA) + (p1σBe
−αp1 − qBDB)
= (p1/D0 − qA)DA + (p1/D0 − qB)DB . (5)
Since p1 is decided after qA and qB , the CP can also ensure
a positive revenue by setting p1/D0 ≥ max(qA, qB).
D. Multi-stage Decision Problem
The decision variables are the prices p1, pA, pB , qA, qB , im-
pacting end users (demand), as well as revenues of providers.
Those variables are decided at different time scales or levels,
that can be described as follows.
1) At the largest time scale, the side payments qA and qB
are decided. In the neutral case, they are either fixed to 0,
or determined as a common value. They can be different
in the non-neutral case, and can be determined either by
the ISPs (in a game), the CP, or a regulator. All those
options will be investigated. Those determinations will
be obtained anticipating the solution of the games below
whatever the values of qA and qB (the so-called backward
induction).
2) At a smaller time scale, for fixed values of qA and
qB , the ISPs fix their prices pA and pB during a non-
cooperative game to attract customers and maximize their
revenues. Here again, the decisions are made anticipating
the solutions at lower levels.
3) At an even smaller time scale, the CP sets the price p1.
Finally, for those fixed values of p1, pA, pB , qA, qB , users
choose their ISP (if not too expensive), and decide whether to
use the service offered by the CP, as described by formulas
(1) and (2).
All those interacting levels are now solved by backward
induction, from the smallest time scale to the largest one.
It is possible to perform the same analysis with a different
hierarchy in the three levels of game, assuming for example
that subscription prices are decided before the side payments.
Though, we think it is reasonable to consider that the decisions
on side-payments to take place on a large time scale, given the
difficulty, span, and costs of such decision processes. Similarly,
regarding the time scale difference between prices set by the
CP and by the ISPs, our approach is consistent with the
(commonly spread) vision that CPs can adapt faster than ISPs,
in part because of the different contract durations binding users
to providers (larger durations with ISPs than with CPs), the
various difficulties to switch ISPs, etc.; see also [22].
III. CONTENT PROVIDER PRICE DETERMINATION
The CP aims at maximizing his revenue U1, for fixed values
of pA, pB , qA, qB , making use of what the total user demand
DA + DB , with Di given by (2), will be. For convenience,
we define Pi := p
β
i .
Proposition 1. Given the side payments qA and qB and the
prices pA and pB decided by the ISPs, the price of the CP
maximizing its revenue (5) is
p∗1 =


PA
PA + PB
(D0qB +
1
α
) +
PB
PA + PB
(D0qA +
1
α
)
if pA > 0 or pB > 0,
D0
qA + qB
2
+
1
α
if pA = 0 and pB = 0
(6)
Proof: We first consider the case pA > 0 and pB > 0.
The derivative ∂U1∂p1 of the CP revenue is then equal to
P0e
−αp1
PA(αqB + (1− αp1)/D0) + PB(αqA + (1− αp1)/D0)
P0PA + P0PB + PAPB
which is strictly positive until p1 achieves the value given in
the first equation of (6), and strictly negative after. Hence the
result.
If pA = 0 (and then PA = 0) and pB > 0 (the opposite case
is symmetric and then omitted), the CP revenue is e−αp1(p1−
D0qA), whose derivative is e
−αp1(1− α(p1 −D0qA)).
Finally, if pA = pB = 0, then the CP revenue is
1
2e
−αp1(2p1 −D0(qA + qB)), and its derivative is e
−αp1(1−
αp1 +
α
2D0(qA + qB)).
Notice that the optimal price does not depend on the outside
option valuation p0. One can also check that it increases with
the price pi of ISP i that has the biggest side payment qi,
and decreases with the other price. In the limit (that can be
interpreted as neutral) case qA = qB = q, the optimal pricing
for the CP is qD0 + 1/α whatever the value of pA and pB .
In that case, as an important remark, the CP’s revenue is
DA +DB
D0α
, which corresponds to the CP-related user welfare:
the interest of users and that of the CP coincide here. Finally,
we can remark that the optimal price for the CP is always
greater than D0 min(qA, qB) + 1/α, because it is a convex
combination of D0qA + 1/α and D0qB + 1/α. In particular,
it is greater than the inverse of the user price sensitivity α.
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IV. PRICING GAME BETWEEN ISPS
Before the users decide which ISP to join and the CP
chooses p1, the ISPs play a pricing game, making use of
what the CP and users decisions would be. In this section, we
determine the Nash equilibrium solutions of this pricing game
in an analytical way when there are no side payments, and
numerically (because intractable) in the general case. Recall
(see [9]) that a Nash equilibrium would be a price profile
(pA, pB) such that no ISP can improve (strictly) his utility by
unilaterally changing his price. The best-response curves are
defined as (by expliciting the dependence of UA and UB on
pA, pB)
BRA(pB) = arg max
pA≥0
UA(pA, pB) and
BRB(pA) = arg max
pB≥0
UB(pA, pB).
With those notations, a Nash equilibrium is a point (pNEA , p
NE
B )
for which BRA(p
NE
B ) = p
NE
A and BRB(p
NE
A ) = p
NE
B . Graphi-
cally, if we draw the two best-response curves on the same
figure, the set of Nash equilibria is then the (possibly empty)
set of intersection points of those curves.
A. No side payments
In the case where no side payments are established, qA =
qB = 0, we get a simple formulation for the revenue of ISPs.
From the previous section, the optimal CP pricing is 1/α.
Using the notation Pi := p
β
i , the revenue of ISP A is then
(the revenue of ISP B being symmetrical)
UA =


P0PBpA
P0PA + P0PB + PAPB
if pA > 0 and pB > 0
0 if pA = 0 or pB = 0
(7)
We first stress that pA = pB = 0 is a Nash equilibrium
since no player can strictly increase his revenue by unilaterally
changing his action: the revenue always remains equal to zero.
But setting one’s price to zero is a dominated strategy, that is
strictly dominated as soon as the adversary price is not zero:
it always yields no revenue whereas a strictly positive revenue
can be guaranteed with any other choice. Therefore it is not
likely to be chosen by ISPs if another equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2. Assuming that there are no side payments, i.e.
qA = qB = 0, then
• if β ≤ 1, there is no Nash equilibrium different from
(0, 0) with finite prices: the only other alternative is both
ISPs setting infinitely large prices (PNEA = P
NE
B =∞),
• if 1 < β < 2, there is a unique Nash equilibrium different
from (0, 0) with PNEA = P
NE
B =
2− β
β − 1
P0,
• if β ≥ 2, (0, 0) is the unique Nash equilibrium, yielding
no revenue for the ISPs.
The proof relies on the following general result about
symmetric games.
Lemma 1. If the best response functions BRA and BRB are
• equal: BRA = BRB = BR,
• single-valued,
• strictly increasing,
then (pA, pB) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if pA = pB =
p with p a fixed point of the best-response function: p = BR(p).
Proof: (Lemma) The pair of prices (pA, pB) is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if pA = BR(pB) and pB = BR(pA).
Let us suppose that pA 6= pB , for instance pA > pB (should
the indexes be permuted). Then:
pB = BR(pA) > BR(pB) = pA,
where the inequality comes from the strict increasingness of
BR, hence a contradiction. At Nash equilibrium, pA = pB is
then a necessary condition, and from the definition of such an
equilibrium, it is necessary and sufficient to have p = BR(p).
Proof: (Proposition) Assuming that pA > 0 and pB > 0,
the derivative of ISP A revenue (7) is
PBP0
(PAPB + PBP0 + PAP0)2
(PA(1− β)(PB + P0) + PBP0) .
Hence the derivative has the same sign as the affine function of
PA: PA(1−β)(PB+P0)+PBP0. When β ≤ 1, that derivative
is always strictly positive for PA ≥ 0, thus (by symmetry) each
ISP should set infinitely large prices.
When β > 1, the derivative of ISP A revenue is strictly
positive while PA is smaller than the unique root of the affine
function above, and negative afterwards. Given pB > 0, the
best-response of ISP A is then
BRA(PB) =
PBP0
(β − 1)(PB + P0)
.
For the case β > 1, notice that the best response is
the same function for ISP B due to symmetry, that equals
BR(P ) = 1(β−1)(1/P0+1/P ) , and is a strictly increasing func-
tion of P . Hence it follows from the previous lemma that
every Nash equilibrium is symmetric, which results here in
the necessary and sufficient condition at Nash equilibrium
PNEB = P
NE
A = BRA(P
NE
A ). The last equation has a unique
strictly positive solution in the case 1 < β < 2, the one given
in the proposition, and no solution otherwise.
This proposition shows in particular that, when the price
sensitivity of users is high (β ≥ 2), we are led to the same
price war as in the model of Bertrand competition studied
in [19]. But for smaller levels of price sensitivity, this does no
longer happen: the price set by ISPs at equilibrium is strictly
positive, hence providing some revenue from users to both
ISPs.
B. Positive side payments
In the general case, the computation of the Nash equilibrium
or even the best response function is not analytically tractable.
We are then led to study numerically the price competition
between ISPs. From here, we take α = 1, p0 = 1, D0 =
1, and β = 1.5. We remark that the choices of p0 and D0
are made without loss of generality (they correspond to unit
changes of ISP prices and data volumes). The choice of α also
corresponds to a unit change in the CP prices, and is therefore
linked to that of p0 (i.e. for a given user sensitivity to the
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Fig. 2. Set Pw of side payments (qA, qB) for which the Nash equilibrium
is such that pNE
A
= pNE
B
= 0, i.e. price war holds.
CP price, the value of α is a consequence of the monetary
unit choice, and thus is determined by the choice for p0).
Therefore our choice of α and of β are subject to discussion.
We however stress here that we have also run experiments
with other values (in the range (1, 2) for parameter β) and
observed similar results.
Let us first remark that if the price set by an ISP (say
ISP A) is equal to zero, then the other ISP (ISP B), at
a Nash equilibrium, sets his price to zero as well. This is
because ISP B does not attract any users if his price is not
zero, and then his revenue is null, whereas the revenue is
1
2qBD0e
−α
2
D0(qA+qB)−1 otherwise, hence strictly positive.
Numerical computations show that there is a set of side
payments qA and qB for which the price war phenomenon
between ISP happens. That set is shown in Figure 2. In the
following, we will denote by Pw the set of side payments for
which a price war between ISPs takes place, leading to null
subscription prices.
Figures 3 to 6 show the prices and revenues at Nash
equilibrium (recall that this is for qA and qB fixed). Numerical
computations point out the fact that the revenue of the CP, and
the user welfare he creates, are always equal at equilibrium,
the reason why we do not plot user welfare here. While
this equality is clear when side payments are the same, our
numerical results suggest that it remains true in the general
case.
Figure 3 represents the price pNEA set by ISP A at Nash
equilibrium, when the side payment qA varies, and for several
ISP B side payments qB . This reveals that the price at
equilibrium first decreases with the side payment set by the
ISP, and then increases. For some value of the opponent ISP
side payment, it goes to zero when a threshold is reached.
That threshold corresponds to the case where the side payment
revenue that ISPs get by setting their prices to zero, and then
attracting the whole set of users, becomes larger than the one
they get on a limited market share with both the subscription
fees and the side payments. This is the price war situation:
equilibrium subscription prices of both ISPs fall down to 0 as
the side payments enter the “price war zone” Pw highlighted
in Figure 2, and each ISP finally only attracts half of the user
0 4
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p
N
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qB = 0
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qB = 3
Fig. 3. ISP A user price pNE
A
at equilibrium as a function of the side payments
qA with qB ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
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qB = 3
Fig. 4. CP optimal price at equilibrium as a function of the side payments
qA with qB ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
set, hence the discontinuity. Finally, we observe that there is
no monotonicity in the opponent side payment.
Figure 4 displays the optimal price p∗1 of the CP in terms of
qA for different values of qB . We can notice the discontinuity
due to the price war thresholds (for the cases qB = 1 and
qB = 2, since there are no such thresholds for the two
other cases from Figure 2). However, this discontinuity is
barely visible, which is quite surprising when compared to
that observed at the ISP level. It can also be remarked that
the optimal price increases with qA (and qB) both before and
after the thresholds, but not in general. One can also check
here the general property that p∗1 ≥ D0 min(qA, qB) + 1/α,
which, in particular, ensures a strictly positive revenue to the
CP.
Figure 5 shows that the revenue of ISPs is not monotonic
with the side payment. Again, some discontinuities occur
when side payments enter and leave the price war zone Pw.
Moreover, depending on the ISP B side payment, the maximal
revenue of ISP A is reached either for a null side payment
(e.g., when qB = 3.0) or for a strictly positive value (e.g.,
when qB = 0.0). This illustrates that predicting the effect
of the various parameters in the output of the game(s) is a
difficult task and game-theoretic tools are helpful here to get
a result: a side payment increase can indeed lead to a content
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Fig. 5. ISP A revenue at equilibrium as a function of the side payment qA
with qB ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
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Fig. 6. CP revenue at equilibrium as a function of the side payment qA,
with qB ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
price increase by the CP to compensate for the loss, and a
reaction of the other ISP; this also has an effect on demand
and depending on the variations, this may or may not result
in an ISP revenue increase.
On the other hand, the CP revenue, plotted in Figure 6,
has a tendency to decrease with side payments, even if it is
not strictly the case, as can be seen for qB = 1 and small
values of qA. When a discontinuity occurs, the CP revenue is
maximized for the smallest side payment leading to the price
war. The non-monotonicity is due to the threshold for the price
war between ISPs, inducing a discontinuity in the ISP prices.
Because of those prices becoming null, the revenue jumps up.
Finally, over the price war set Pw, the CP subscription price
is p1 = D0
qA+qB
2 +
1
α and the revenues are
Ui =
1
2
qiD0e
−
αD0
2
(qA+qB)−1 (8)
U1 = UWCP =
1
α
e−
αD0
2
(qA+qB)−1. (9)
V. SIDE PAYMENTS DETERMINATION
We consider at the highest level three possibilities for the
choice of the side payments qA and qB . We first look at the
case when they are determined by the CP (even if unlikely in
practice), then the case when they result from a game played
0 4
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
qA
U
1
qB = 0.2
qB = 0.3
qB = 0.4
Fig. 7. CP revenue at equilibrium as a function of the side payment qA, with
qB ∈ {0.2, 0.3, 0.4}. The maximal revenue is reached when qA = qB =
0.3.
between ISPs, and finally the case when they are determined
by a regulator (e.g., to maximize social welfare).
Since we don’t have the analytical expression for the ISPs
price at Nash equilibrium, we provide numerical results, where
we take α = 1, β = 1.5, p0 = 1 and D0 = 1.
A. Determined by the CP
The revenue of the CP is maximized when the side pay-
ments are qA = qB = 0.3 as illustrated in Figure 7 (instead of
plotting a hard-to-read 3D-curve of CP revenue in terms of qA
and qB , we have preferred to draw 2D-curves in terms of one
of the parameters for various values of the second parameter
close to optimal). It is interesting to notice that, for such a set
of side payments, there is a price war on the user prices, i.e.,
pNEA = p
NE
B = 0 here. In fact it corresponds to the symmetric
(qA = qB) point of the price war set Pw described in Figure 2
for which the sum of side payments is minimized. Indeed, if
pNEA = p
NE
B = 0, then the revenue of the CP can be rewritten
as U1 =
1
αe
−
αD0
2
(qA+qB)−1, and then is maximized when
qA + qB is minimal.
At this point the revenues of the stakeholders are UA =
UB ≈ 0.04, and UWCP = U1 ≈ 0.27. Hence the revenues
of ISPs are much smaller than the one of the CP. Note that
the situation is quite counter-intuitive, since the CP gains
to introduce side payments. This is because those payments
exacerbate the competition between ISPs, which is beneficial
to end users, and finally to the CP who can reach more
customers.
B. Determined by the ISPs, through a game
If we instead assume that the side payments are non-
cooperatively determined by the ISPs, we are led to study
the best response of each ISP to the other ISP side payment.
As shown in Figure 8, the best response is first increasing
in the other ISP side payments, and then falls to zero above
a threshold, which is approximately 2.80. Since the best-
response to a null price is 2.80, it follows that (0, 2.80) and
the symmetric point (2.80, 0) are Nash equilibria, and they are
the only ones. It is interesting to notice that the resulting side
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Fig. 8. The optimal side payment of each ISP as a function of the opponent
ISP side payment. There is a threshold qi ≈ 2.80 beyond which the best
response falls to zero. There are two Nash equilibria (NE) where one ISP sets
its side payment to zero.
payments are not symmetric at Nash equilibrium, so are the
revenues equalling 0.42 for the ISP with side payment 2.80
and 0.34 for the other ISP.
Now let us compare that outcome to the case without
any side payments. From Subsection IV-A, with β = 1.5,
the revenue of ISPs is 0.33. Hence the ISPs global revenue
increases by about 15%, which goes in the direction of ISPs
arguments about side payments improving their revenue. On
the other side, the CP revenue decreases from 0.25 to 0.06,
hence losing nearly 75% of its value. The benefit of ISPs is
then at the expense of the CP and consequently of the user
welfare.
C. Determined by a regulator
A regulator can either decide to maximize the revenue of the
supply chain (sum of utilities of the ISPs plus the CP), the user
welfare (end-users surplus), or the social welfare (including
user welfare and all providers utilities).
The total value of the supply chain is the total revenue got
from the users, i.e., U1 + UA + UB .
User welfare can be decomposed into two components: the
user welfare due to the existence of the CP -that is computed
in (3)-, and the user welfare due to the presence of the ISPs.
Let us focus on the latter part: we have assumed that users
not connected to the Internet perceive a cost p0 (thus p0 can
be seen as the value of the connectivity service). When a
user decides to subscribe to ISP i and pays the corresponding
price pi, its benefit is then p0 − pi with respect to the no-ISP
situation: the user does not bear anymore the cost p0 of not
having Internet access, and instead perceives the monetary cost
pi. Aggregating over the whole population, the user welfare
that is due to the presence of the ISPs (with their prices pA
and pB) equals
UWISPs = σA(p0 − pA) + σB(p0 − pB).
The global user welfare generated by the system (ISPs and
CP) is therefore
UW = UWCP + UWISPs (10)
Finally, social welfare is defined as the overall value of the
service for the society. It therefore includes the surpluses of
all actors, and equals SW = U1 + UA + UB + UW Note
that Social Welfare also corresponds to the total value that the
service has for subscribers, without considering any monetary
exchanges because they stay within the society. We indeed
obtain, simplifying the sum of the terms in SW:
SW = (σA + σB)
(
p0 +
(
p1 +
1
α
)
e−αp1
)
,
where the term (σA + σB)p0 is the value of the connectivity
service for ISPs’ subscribers, and the other term is the value
of the CP service for CP subscribers, computed as
(σA + σB)
∫ ∞
p1
αe−αxx dx.
1) Side payments to maximize User Welfare: Since CP
revenue and user welfare are equal at Nash equilibrium, it
follows that user welfare is maximized when the CP revenue
is maximized. This case has already been treated in Subsec-
tion V-A.
2) Side payments to maximize Social Welfare: We have
obtained numerically that social welfare is maximized for the
same side payments as the ones maximizing the CP revenue
and the user welfare.
3) Side payments to maximize the supply chain value: The
supply chain value is maximized when the side payments are
both null, which has been studied in Subsection IV-A. In this
neutral case the revenue of ISPs is approximately 0.33 whereas
that of the CP (and the induced user welfare) is 0.25. We
can remark that among the three alternatives considered in
this subsection, this one leads to the fairest revenue sharing
between stakeholders.
VI. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have provided in this paper a model describing the
interactions between two ISPs in competition, a CP, and end
users connecting to the network. With respect to the literature,
we believe that considering competitive ISPs and a single CP
is a more realistic representation of the current network where
we have a quasi-monopoly for some applications (for instance
YouTube or Netflix), while several ISPs are in competition
(an argument of ISPs). The goal is to study the impact of
side payments on providers’ revenues, and conclude whether
they can help reduce the unfairness of the current revenue
sharing among all actors, as claimed by ISPs in the current
network neutrality debate. We restricted the analysis to two
ISPs because in many cases, competition is limited to a very
small number of ISPs, and very often only two ISPs are
available to a given user [22]; but a numerical analysis can
be extended to more than two.
In this paper, we have presented a three-level game where
(from the largest to the shortest time scale) the side payments
are first determined, then a pricing game is played between
ISPs, followed by the content provider price, and finally,
knowing all those prices, end users choose their ISP (or none
if too expensive) and possibly decide to subscribe also to the
CP service. All those levels are played by backward induction,
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meaning that players anticipate the solutions of the later games
when choosing their strategies.
Our results have highlighted the fact that side payments,
unless decided by ISPs, have little chance to address the
concern from ISPs regarding the fairness of the revenue
sharing associated with users accessing content through their
infrastructures. This is due, to a great extent, to the competition
played among ISPs on the access prices that drives their
revenues to low values. On the other hand, the CP being in
a monopolist situation, always obtains significant revenues.
An interesting paradox we have highlighted is that side pay-
ments may be beneficial to the CP. Nevertheless, when side
payments are decided by the ISPs (non-cooperatively), it can
be beneficial to them, but at the expense of both the CP and
the users. Remarkably, the side payments maximizing social
and user welfare are the same than those maximizing the CP
revenue. But looking at the whole supply chain, in order to
avoid too big disparities between revenues of providers, the
neutral case is the most suitable. If the side payments are
decided non-cooperatively by ISPs, in our experiment, one
(only) is a big winner, while the other ISP gains a bit more
than in the neutral case. This asymmetry may be a problem
and can create complicated tensions and negotiations.
As future research, we would like to go into several direc-
tions: first to include several CPs with different contents, but
such that some end users are targeting only a subset of them,
for all possible subsets. ISPs may also charge each other to
let the CPs not connected to them reach their own customers
(transit pricing). Other extensions to our model could include
architecture investment and content innovation characteristics,
for the ISPs and the CP respectively.
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